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## Borrower Mobility, Adverse Selection, and Mortgage Points

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Bureau of Economic and Business Research  
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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign



# **BEBR**

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November 1993

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# **Borrower Mobility, Adverse Selection, and Mortgage Points**

by

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## **Abstract**

This paper analyzes a simple mobility-based model of mortgage lending and uses the results to illuminate the issue of mortgage points. The model predicts the points/interest-rate trade-off observed in the market, and it also predicts that mobile borrowers choose low-points/high-rate contracts from the available menu, in conformance with conventional wisdom. These outcomes are shown to be a result of adverse selection, which arises because of the lender's inability to distinguish the mobility characteristics of borrowers. Empirical evidence is also presented showing the presence of a points/interest-rate trade-off in the market. In addition, relying on a proxy variable, the results establish that borrowers choose contracts from this menu according to mobility. The individual utility function is also estimated, which allows the marginal rate of substitution between points and the mortgage interest rate to be computed for different types of borrowers.



# Borrower Mobility, Adverse Selection, and Mortgage Points

by

Jan K. Brueckner\*

## 1. Introduction

It is now widely recognized that when a borrower chooses from among the menu of contracts available in the mortgage market, mobility plays an important role in the decision. This effect is perhaps clearest in the choice between fixed and adjustable-rate mortgages. A highly mobile borrower can exploit the lower initial rate on an ARM loan to enjoy lower payments over the short expected holding period of his mortgage. Mobile borrowers should therefore prefer ARMs over fixed-rate mortgages, a tendency that is confirmed empirically by Dhillon, Shilling and Sirmans (1987) and Brueckner and Follain (1988).<sup>1</sup>

Another decision where the role of mobility is generally acknowledged is the choice of mortgage points. Points consist of an up-front fee, expressed as a percentage of the mortgage amount, paid to lender at the time of loan origination. Typically, borrowers are offered a menu of contracts embodying a trade-off between points and the loan interest rate: a high-points loan carries a low interest rate, and vice versa. In making choices from this menu, mobile borrowers place relatively little weight on any interest-rate premium because of their short expected holding period, and are thus drawn to a low-points mortgage. Sedentary borrowers, for whom the loan rate is more important, prefer to pay high points to secure a low rate.

While this description of borrower behavior is widely accepted (see Dunn and Spatt (1988), for example), there have been few attempts to explain why the menu of points/interest-rate choices emerges in the first place. One explanation is provided by Chari and Jagannathan (1989), who develop a model based on income uncertainty.<sup>2</sup> In their framework, the potential mover has a riskier income stream than a sedentary borrower, and a move only occurs when his future income realization is favorable. The optimal mortgage contract provides insurance to the potential mover, which comes in the form of a lower rate (enjoyed in the unfavorable state, where a move does not occur) together with mortgage points, which

are forfeited when income is high and the borrower moves. The insurance offered through the mortgage contract is reduced, relative to the full-information case, when the lender cannot distinguish between borrower types. Although this model offers numerous insights, its predictions are exactly the reverse of the those sketched above: the mobile borrower chooses a loan with *high* points and a *low* rate, contrary to the conventional wisdom.

The present paper develops a different mobility-based model of mortgage lending that may advance our understanding of mortgage points. The model portrays the borrower as choosing a two-period mortgage with fixed payments that may differ across time. There is no income uncertainty, but there is a chance the borrower moves midway through the term of his mortgage, in which case the second payment is not made. The model has two borrower types differentiated by their probabilities of moving, and the analysis explores the nature of the mortgage market equilibrium when these types are indistinguishable to the lender. It is shown that the equilibrium menu of contracts exhibits a trade-off between initial and final payments. The contract with low initial and high final payments is chosen by the high-mobility borrower, while the low-mobility borrower opts for a contract with the reverse features. As in Chari and Jagannathan (1989), the equilibrium involves adverse selection in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In particular, the lender's inability to distinguish between borrower types distorts the available contract choices, lowering welfare relative to the full-information case.

To see the mortgage-points interpretation of the model, let the initial mortgage payment equal interest plus mortgage points, with the final payment representing interest alone. The trade-off between final and initial payments then implies a trade-off between points and the mortgage interest rate like the one observed in the market. In addition, selection of contracts by borrower types conforms to conventional wisdom: the high-mobility borrower's choice of the low-initial-payment/high-final-payment contract corresponds to a low-points/high-rate choice, a vice versa for the low mobility borrower. Thus, the analysis shows that a simple mobility-based model is capable of generating equilibria that closely resemble the one envisioned in the conventional view of mortgage points. Moreover, the genesis of mortgage points is shown to be a response to asymmetric information: points are a device by which lenders induce borrowers to self-select across mortgage contracts according to unobserved

mobility.

The analysis sketched above is presented in Section 2 of the paper. Section 2 also discusses the effect of introducing a prepayment penalty into the model. Many authors argue that mortgage points are a substitute for the prepayment penalty, and the analysis is directed toward evaluating this claim. Section 3 offers empirical evidence relevant to the model using a database compiled by the National Association of Realtors (the data gives information on individual loan transactions). The empirical analysis begins by demonstrating that a points/interest-rate trade-off is indeed present in the data. Then, using a proxy for borrower mobility, it is shown that mobile borrowers do in fact choose mortgage contracts with low points, confirming the predictions of the model as well as conventional wisdom. Finally, an attempt is made to test for the presence of adverse selection.

## 2. Analysis

**a. The model.** All borrowers in the model purchase identical, fixed-size houses. For simplicity, the mortgage used to finance each purchase is assumed to be a 100 percent loan, with the size of the loan (value of the standard house) normalized to unity. Mortgages have a term of two periods, and they require fixed payments that may differ across time.<sup>3</sup> Payments in the two periods (denoted zero and one) are equal to  $i_0$  and  $i_1$ . Note that since the house size is fixed, housing consumption can be suppressed as an argument of the borrower's utility function, introduced below. Note also that the assumption of a two-period mortgage term is made only for simplicity; use of a longer, more realistic term would have no effect on the analysis.

The borrower may move at the end of period zero after having made one mortgage payment, an event that occurs exogenously with probability  $\rho$ . Different values of  $\rho$  distinguish the two borrower types in the model: high-mobility borrowers have  $\rho = \rho_h$  and low-mobility borrowers have  $\rho = \rho_l$ , where  $\rho_l < \rho_h$ . Both types of borrowers have constant income per period equal to  $y$ . In addition, both have the same concave Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function  $V(\cdot)$  as well as the same discount factor  $\delta$ . Under these assumptions, expected utility for a type- $m$  borrower,  $m = h, l$ , can be written

$$(1 - \rho_m)[V(y - i_0) + \delta V(y - i_1) + \delta^2 \Gamma_m] + \rho_m[V(y - i_0) + \delta \Psi_m]. \quad (1)$$

The first bracketed term in (1) is discounted utility when no move occurs, an event that has probability  $(1 - \rho_m)$  for  $m = h, l$ .  $\Gamma_m$  in this expression equals type- $m$  expected utility as of period two given that a move did not occur in period one. Similarly, the second bracketed expression is discounted utility given that a move did occur ( $\Psi_m$  equals expected utility as of period one in this case). The quantities  $\Gamma_m$  and  $\Psi_m$ , which reflect the outcome of future decisions, are assumed to be independent of  $i_0$  and  $i_1$ .<sup>4</sup>

Observe that (1) does not include a downpayment on the house purchase or a return of housing equity upon sale, a consequence of the assumption of 100 percent financing.<sup>5</sup> In addition, it should be noted that the present formulation rules out *financially-motivated* mortgage prepayment, *i.e.*, refinancing. Incorporating such prepayment would complicate the model, obscuring the main points of interest.<sup>6</sup>

Indifference curves in  $i_0 - i_1$  space differ between high-mobility and low-mobility borrowers, and this difference is central to the analysis. Differentiating (1), the marginal rates of substitution between  $i_1$  and  $i_0$  for the type- $h$  and type- $l$  borrowers are equal to

$$MRS_h \equiv \frac{V'(y - i_0)}{\delta(1 - \rho_h)V'(y - i_1)} > MRS_l \equiv \frac{V'(y - i_0)}{\delta(1 - \rho_l)V'(y - i_1)}, \quad (2)$$

where the inequality follows because  $\rho_h > \rho_l$ . The indifference curves of the type- $h$  borrower are therefore steeper than those of the type- $l$  borrower in  $i_0 - i_1$  space. Differentiating (2), it is easily seen that the indifference curves are concave (also, utility increases moving toward the origin).

Lenders rely on short-term borrowing to generate loanable mortgage funds. The cost per dollar of funds in period zero is denoted  $r_0$ , and the expected cost in period one is denoted  $r_1$ . It is important to note that  $r_0$  includes both the interest cost of short-term funds and the administrative costs of mortgage origination, which are incurred in period zero. Therefore,  $r_0 > r_1$  is likely to hold even in the case where the lender's borrowing costs are expected to rise over time.

The lender is assumed to be risk neutral and to discount future profit by the factor  $\theta$ . Expected profit per dollar of loan to a type- $m$  borrower is then<sup>7</sup>

$$(1 - \rho_m)[i_0 - r_0 + \theta(i_1 - r_1)] + \rho_m(i_0 - r_0), \quad m = h, l. \quad (3)$$

The term in brackets is discounted profit when the borrower does not move, and  $i_0 - r_0$  is discounted profit when a move occurs (in the latter case, no mortgage income is earned in period one). Setting (3) equal to zero and rearranging yields the zero-profit locus for type- $m$  lending:

$$i_1 = r_1 + \frac{r_0 - i_0}{\theta(1 - \rho_m)}, \quad m = h, l. \quad (4)$$

The loci described in (4), which give combinations of  $i_0$  and  $i_1$  where type- $m$  lending yields zero expected profit, are downward-sloping straight lines. The type- $h$  locus is steeper than the type- $l$  locus given  $\rho_h > \rho_l$ , and the loci intersect at the point  $(i_0, i_1) = (r_0, r_1)$ , as shown in Figure 1.<sup>8</sup>

Referring to Figure 1, it is evident that the zero-profit  $i_1$  value for the  $h$ -types can be higher or lower than the value for the  $l$ -types, depending on whether  $i_0$  is below or above  $r_0$ . Intuitively, if  $i_0 < r_0$ , then zero profit requires that the lender earn a positive profit on period-one lending (i.e.,  $i_1 > r_1$ ). The excess of  $i_1$  above  $r_1$ , however, must be greater for the  $h$ -types since the profit has a lower probability of being realized. The type- $h$  locus must therefore lie above the type- $l$  locus to the left of the intersection. A parallel argument shows the loci must have the reverse relationship to the right of the intersection.

**b. Equilibrium.** The first step in the analysis of equilibrium is to establish the relationship between the indifference curves and the zero-profit loci. Suppose that a type- $h$  indifference curve is tangent to the type- $h$  zero-profit locus above the intersection point of the two loci (denoted  $Q$ ), as shown in Figure 1. Then the tangency point between a type- $l$  indifference curve and the type- $l$  locus must also lie above  $Q$ , as shown. Generally, *the tangency points between indifference curves and the respective zero-profit loci for the two types lie on the same side of  $Q$* . To establish this fact, observe that the type- $m$  tangency point will be above (below)  $Q$  when the indifference curve is steeper (less steep) than the locus at  $Q$ , or as

$$\frac{V'(y - r_0)}{\delta(1 - \rho_m)V'(y - r_1)} > (<) \frac{1}{\theta(1 - \rho_m)} \quad m = h, l \quad (5)$$

(the slope expressions come from (2) and (4)). However, since the  $(1 - \rho_m)$  term cancels on

both sides of this inequality, it follows that if the inequality holds for one borrower type, it holds for both, establishing the above claim.

From (5), the location of both tangency points relative to  $Q$  depends on the relation between  $V'(y - r_0)/\delta V'(y - r_1)$  and  $1/\theta$ . Suppose that  $r_0 = r_1$ , so that the cost of funds is the same in both periods (implying higher pure borrowing costs in period one), and  $\delta = \theta$ , so that the borrower and lender discount the future identically. Then the two expressions above are equal, and each indifference curve is tangent to its respective zero-profit locus at  $Q$ . However, if  $\delta$  falls relative to  $\theta$ , or if  $r_1$  declines relative to  $r_0$ , then the slope of each indifference curve at  $Q$  rises relative to the slope of its respective locus (recall that  $V$  is concave). The tangencies then move uphill, away from  $Q$ . Conversely, when  $\delta$  or  $r_1$  rises, the tangencies move away from  $Q$  in the downhill direction. Thus, tangencies above  $Q$  result from a relatively low valuation of the future by the borrower or a low future cost of funds, with the reverse cases yielding tangencies below  $Q$ .

Another fact concerns the location of the tangency points relative to one another. It can be shown that a tangency point on the lower zero-profit locus must lie to the *southwest* of a tangency on the upper locus. Thus, point  $B$  in Figure 1 must lie to the southwest of point  $A$ , as shown, and the same relationship must hold when the tangencies are located below  $Q$ .<sup>9</sup>

With this background, the analysis of equilibrium can proceed, using the approach of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Consider first the full-information case, where the lender can identify borrowers by type. In this case, the lender can earmark a particular mortgage contract for a given type of borrower, preventing the other type from choosing it. A full-information equilibrium consists of a set of mortgage contracts and an assignment of borrowers to contracts such that

- (i) lenders earn zero profit
- (ii) no contract outside the set attracts borrowers while earning nonnegative profit.

Under full information, the equilibrium contracts correspond to the tangency points on the zero-profit loci for the two types of borrowers. Thus, contracts  $A$  and  $B$ , assigned to type- $h$  and type- $l$  borrowers respectively, constitute the full-information equilibrium in the



situation shown in Figure 1. In the alternate case, equilibrium contracts lie at tangencies below  $Q$ .<sup>10</sup>

In the full-information equilibrium shown in Figure 1, the type- $h$  borrower prefers the contract assigned to the type- $l$  borrower (contract  $B$ ) to his own assignment (contract  $A$ ). Earmarking prevents the type- $h$  individual from selecting this preferred option. When the lender cannot distinguish between borrower types, however, earmarking is not possible and borrower separation across contracts must be voluntary. Equilibria must then satisfy incentive-compatibility constraints, which state that each borrower type weakly prefers the contract designed for his type to the one designed for the other type (note that “assigning” contracts to types is no longer feasible since the types are not observable).

To satisfy the relevant incentive-compatibility constraint, the type- $l$  contract must be moved to a position on the zero-profit locus where it is no longer strictly preferred by the type- $h$  borrower. Such a position is shown in Figure 2 as contract  $F$ . Contracts downhill from  $F$  also satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint, but they leave profit opportunities for lenders.<sup>11</sup> Equilibrium contracts are therefore  $F$  and  $A$ .<sup>12</sup>

In the alternate case where the full-information contracts lie below  $Q$  (see Figure 2), the type- $l$  borrower prefers the type- $h$  contract ( $G$ ) to the one assigned to him ( $K$ ). To satisfy the relevant incentive-compatibility constraint, the type- $h$  contract must be relocated to the position shown as  $J$ . Equilibrium contracts in this case are thus  $J$  and  $K$ .

Several features of these equilibria are noteworthy. First, observe that regardless of which case applies, the equilibrium set of contracts exhibits a trade-off between initial and final payments. Comparison of the contracts ( $A$  vs.  $F$ , and  $J$  vs.  $K$ ) shows that one has a high  $i_0$  and a low  $i_1$  while the other has the reverse features. Moreover, in both cases, the high-mobility borrower chooses the low- $i_0$ /high- $i_1$  contract, while the low-mobility borrower chooses the contract with the reverse features.

The second noteworthy aspect of the equilibria is that asymmetric information lowers the welfare of one borrower type relative to the full-information case. When the tangencies are above  $Q$ , the type- $l$  borrower is hurt by the lender’s inability to distinguish the types (he gets contract  $F$  instead of  $B$ ). Conversely, when the tangencies are below  $Q$ , asymmetric information harms the type- $h$  borrower. These two possibilities provide an apparent contrast

to the usual outcome with adverse selection, where harm is done only to a particular class of agent (for example, the “low risk” insurance buyer is hurt in the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)). However, this contrast disappears upon closer inspection when it is realized that a borrower’s “riskiness” is endogenous in the present model, and depends on the magnitude of  $i_0$ . In particular, when  $i_0 > r_0$  holds, so that  $i_1 < r_1$  and period-one profit is negative, the “high-risk” borrower is the type- $l$  individual, whose low  $\rho$  forces the lender to absorb the period-one loss with high probability. Thus, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz, the low-risk individual (the type- $h$  borrower) is the one harmed by adverse selection when the equilibrium lies below  $Q$ . Similarly, because of their high move probability, and the corresponding low chance of earning a period-one profit, the type- $h$  individuals are the high-risk group in the case where  $i_0 < r_0$ . Thus, adverse selection again harms the low-risk individual (the type- $l$  borrower) when the equilibrium lies above  $Q$ .<sup>13</sup>

**c. Mortgage points.** As explained in the introduction, the model has a mortgage-points interpretation. To see this, let the period-one payment represent the mortgage interest rate, and let the period-zero payment equal the interest rate plus mortgage points. In other words,  $i_1 = t$  and  $i_0 = t + p$ , where  $t$  is the interest rate and  $p$  is points (recall that  $i_0$  and  $i_1$  are payments per dollar of loan, and that the mortgage size is normalized to one). Then, for points to emerge in equilibrium, it must be the case that the equilibrium contracts satisfy  $i_0 > i_1$ , lying below the 45 degree line in Figure 2 (otherwise,  $p < 0$ ).

Supposing for the moment that the equilibrium satisfies this requirement, it has a number of realistic features. First, the trade-off between  $i_0$  and  $i_1$  noted above generates a trade-off between mortgage points and the interest rate like the one observed in the market. Referring to contracts  $J$  and  $K$ , the inequalities  $i_1^J > i_1^K$  and  $i_0^J < i_0^K$  imply  $t^J > t^K$  and  $t^J + p^J < t^K + p^K$ . Subtracting the latter inequalities yields  $p^J < p^K$ , so that contract  $J$  has low points and a high interest rate relative to contract  $K$ . Moreover, borrowers choose from the points/interest-rate menu according to conventional wisdom: the high-mobility borrower chooses  $J$ , the low-points/high-rate contract, while the low-mobility borrower chooses the  $K$ , the high-points/low-rate contract. Similar observations apply when the equilibrium lies above  $Q$ .

A problem with this points interpretation is that nothing in the model guarantees that

the equilibrium contracts lie below the 45 degree line. Indeed, instead of voluntarily selecting mortgages with front-loaded payments, as required under the points interpretation, impatient borrowers are likely to prefer contracts where payments *rise* over time (satisfying  $i_0 < i_1$ ). This outcome, however, violates a constraint imposed on real-world contracts that so far has been omitted from the model. The constraint rules out mortgages with *ascending* payment streams, which may lead to negative amortization and thus expose the lender to default risk.

These observations suggest that a more realistic model might impose the constraint  $i_0 \geq i_1$  while assuming that borrowers prefer an ascending payment pattern. Full-information contracts would then consist of corner solutions with  $i_0 = i_1$ , located where the 45 degree line crosses the respective zero-profit loci. The nature of equilibria under such a modification depends on the location of  $Q$  relative to the 45 degree line, which in turn depends on the relative magnitudes of its coordinates,  $r_0$  and  $r_1$ . Figure 3 shows the case where  $Q$  lies below the line, which requires  $r_0 > r_1$ . This case is most plausible given that  $r_0$  includes the administrative costs of mortgage origination, while  $r_1$  represents pure borrowing costs (see above).

Contracts  $W$  and  $U$  in Figure 3 constitute the full-information contracts, which are corner solutions involving zero points ( $i_0 = i_1$ ). Equilibrium contracts under asymmetric information are  $W$  and  $X$ , chosen by the type- $h$  and type- $l$  borrowers respectively. The key feature of this equilibrium is that while both borrower types prefer zero-points contracts, asymmetric information prevents the type- $l$  borrower from satisfying this preference. Separation of the borrower types can only be achieved by offering the  $l$ -type an inferior choice (contract  $X$ ) that involves payment of positive points. It should be noted that this outcome depends critically on the assumption that  $r_0 > r_1$ , so that  $Q$  lies below the 45 degree line. If  $Q$  instead lies above the line, borrowers' choices do not follow conventional wisdom, with the positive-points contract chosen by the type- $h$  instead of the type- $l$  borrower.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the presence of administrative costs, which makes  $r_0 > r_1$  a plausible assumption, is critical in generating an equilibrium with the expected features.

This discussion shows that when the constraint  $i_0 \geq i_1$  is imposed and  $Q$  is realistically below the 45 degree line, all equilibria conform to the points interpretation. In the case where the constraint is binding, and in the alternative case where it is not, the equilibrium contains

a menu of contracts that exhibits a trade-off between  $i_0$  and  $i_1$ , implying a trade-off between points and interest rate, and borrowers select from the menu according to conventional wisdom. Since all equilibria have this property, the model thus *explains* the emergence of mortgage points. The analysis suggests that points serve as a device by which lenders induce borrowers to self-select across mortgage contracts according to unobserved mobility. The resulting need to satisfy an incentive-compatibility constraint, which forces both equilibrium contracts to lie on a single indifference curve for one borrower type, generates a trade-off between points and the mortgage interest rate.

While the model is built on the assumption of asymmetric information, it is interesting to note that identical results would emerge if earmarking of mortgage contracts were legally prohibited. To see this, suppose that information were perfect, with lenders able to identify type- $h$  and type- $l$  borrowers, but that legal restrictions were to prevent lenders from assigning borrowers to contracts on the basis of personal characteristics. Then, despite the presence of full information, equilibrium contracts would have to satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint, with the attendant distortions of choice. The points/interest-rate trade-off, then, can arise either from asymmetric information or from legal prohibitions on earmarking.

**d. The effect of a prepayment penalty.** Prepayment penalties, which force the borrower to pay a fee to the lender if the mortgage is paid off prematurely, are now infrequently used in the U.S. However, many commentators view points and prepayment penalties as perfect substitutes, noting that points (like the prepayment penalty) represent a sizable sum that is forfeited when the mortgage is prepaid (see Chari and Jagannathan (1989) and Kau and Keenan (1987), for example). Given this view, it is interesting to investigate the effect of a prepayment penalty in the present model.<sup>15</sup> The ensuing analysis shows that, in the presence of adverse selection, the prepayment penalty is *not* a perfect substitute for mortgage points. Introduction of such a penalty can either raise or lower welfare, depending on the nature of the equilibrium.

Let  $s$  denote the prepayment penalty per dollar of loan, which is paid in the event that the loan is terminated after period zero. With this modification, the last term in the expected utility expression (1) is replaced by  $\rho_m[V(y - i_0 - s) + \delta\Psi_m]$ , and the last term in the profit expression (3) is replaced by  $\rho_m(i_0 - r_0 + s)$ . Introduction of the penalty corresponds

to an exogenous increase in  $s$ , starting from a situation where  $s = 0$ . As will be seen, the effect of this perturbation depends on whether the equilibrium contracts lie above or below  $Q$ . The analysis focuses on an equilibrium where the constraint  $i_0 \geq i_1$  is not binding, and the below- $Q$  case is treated first (for concreteness, the equilibrium contracts are labeled  $J$  and  $K$ , as in Figure 2).

The low-mobility borrower, who chooses contract  $K$ , satisfies the tangency condition when  $s = 0$ , and he will continue to do so after a marginal increase in  $s$ . Therefore, the impact on his choices can be found by totally differentiating the following equations with respect to  $s$ , evaluating at  $s = 0$ :

$$\frac{(1 - \rho_l)V'(y - i_0^K) + \rho_l V'(y - i_0^K - s)}{\delta(1 - \rho_l)V'(y - i_1^K)} = \frac{1}{\theta(1 - \rho_l)} \quad (6)$$

$$i_1^K = r_1 + \frac{r_0 - i_0^K - \rho_l s}{\theta(1 - \rho_l)}. \quad (7)$$

Eq. (6) is the tangency condition, and its left-hand side equals the new MRS (reflecting the modification of (1)) evaluated at  $K$ . Eq. (7) is the modified zero-profit condition. Differentiating (6) and (7) yields, after some manipulation,

$$\frac{\partial i_1^K}{\partial s} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial i_0^K}{\partial s} = -\rho_l. \quad (8)$$

From (8), introduction of the prepayment penalty has no effect on  $i_1$  for the type- $l$  borrower while lowering  $i_0$ . Under the points interpretation, introduction of the penalty thus leaves the interest-rate ( $i_1$ ) unchanged while lowering points by an amount  $\rho_l$ , equal to the expected penalty. Moreover, as shown in the appendix, the penalty has no effect on the welfare of the type- $l$  borrower. Thus, when the borrower is initially at a tangency, the prepayment penalty is indeed a perfect substitute for mortgage points.

In the full-information case, contract  $G$  would be selected by the type- $h$  borrower, and the above conclusions (which apply to any tangency solution) would hold. Both borrowers would then be unaffected by introduction of the prepayment penalty. With adverse selection, however, the type- $h$  borrower chooses contract  $J$ , and the impact of an increase in  $s$  is

evaluated by differentiating another set of equations. The first is a zero-profit condition analogous to (7). The second is a condition requiring the expected utility of the type- $h$  contract, evaluated from the type- $l$  borrower's point of view, to remain constant as  $s$  increases. This condition forces the type- $h$  contract to remain on a fixed type- $l$  indifference curve as  $s$  rises, as required in an adverse-selection equilibrium (the indifference curve is fixed because type- $l$  utility is unaffected as  $s$  rises). As shown in the appendix, differentiation of these conditions yields

$$\frac{\partial i_1^J}{\partial s} > 0 \quad (9)$$

as well as

$$\frac{\partial i_0^J}{\partial s} > (<) 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial i_0^J - i_1^J}{\partial s} < 0. \quad (10)$$

Introduction of the prepayment penalty thus has an ambiguous effect on  $i_0$  for the type- $h$  borrower, while raising  $t = i_1^J$  and lowering  $p = i_0^J - i_1^J$ . Since the decline in points is accompanied by an increase in the interest rate, points and the prepayment penalty are *not* perfect substitutes from the perspective of the type- $h$  borrower. This nonequivalence generates a welfare impact, which the appendix shows to be negative: expected utility *falls* for the type- $h$  borrower as the penalty is introduced.

To gain some insight into this result, compare the case where the tangencies are above  $Q$  and the type- $l$  borrower is the one hurt by adverse selection. The appendix shows that in this case, introduction of the prepayment penalty has no effect on the type- $h$  borrower while *raising* the welfare of the type- $l$  borrower. The penalty thus affects the borrower who is harmed by adverse selection, but the direction of the impact hinges on the borrower's identity. When the affected borrower is of type  $h$ , a loss occurs; when the borrower is of type  $l$ , a welfare gain emerges. These results arise because the prepayment penalty imposes a disproportionate burden on the high-mobility borrower, who is more likely to pay it. If type- $h$  welfare is already compromised by adverse selection, addition of this extra burden lowers it further. While the burden's (first-order) impact vanishes when the type- $h$  borrower is at a tangency point, the change nevertheless improves the lot of the type- $l$  borrower, who finds that the burden of adverse selection lessens.

### 3. Empirical evidence

The purpose of the empirical work is to test three hypotheses that emerge from the preceding analysis. The first hypothesis is that the menu of available mortgage contracts exhibits a points/interest-rate trade-off. Since this hypothesis is obviously true on the basis of casual empiricism, the only task is to verify that the trade-off exists in the present data. The second hypothesis is that mobile borrowers choose low-points/high-rate contracts. While verification of this hypothesis supports the model, it can also be viewed as a corroboration of conventional wisdom independent of the model. The third hypothesis is that the mortgage market equilibrium involves adverse selection. This hypothesis is, of course, not part of conventional wisdom, and empirical evidence in favor of it would lend support to the present framework.

**a. Data.** Empirical evidence is developed using the Home Financing Transaction Database compiled by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). This database comes from a quarterly nationwide survey of a select panel of real estate brokers, and it provides detailed information about individual mortgage transactions, including features of the mortgage contract, characteristics of the borrower, and characteristics of the property. The empirical analysis focuses on transactions for the four years 1988-1991. A number of additional restrictions are applied to generate the sample. First, only 30-year fixed-rates mortgages are included, consistent with the model's focus on fixed-payment contracts. Attention is also restricted to conventional contracts (FHA and VA mortgages are thus excluded). Contracts involving a second or third mortgage, seller-paid points, interest-rate buydowns, a mortgage assumption, or seller financing are also excluded. Finally, observations are excluded if there are missing values for any of the borrower-characteristics variables used to compute the mobility proxy (discussed below), as are observations with missing mortgage points. The resulting sample has 418 observations, fairly evenly distributed across the sample years. The mean interest rate in the sample is 9.96%, and the distribution of mortgage points is shown in Table 1 (points are measured in basis points).

**b. Rate regressions.** The first step in the empirical analysis is to verify that the data exhibit a trade-off between the mortgage interest rate (denoted *RATE*) and points (*POINTS*). This is done by regressing *RATE* on *POINTS*, controlling for temporal

and regional effects.<sup>16</sup> Temporal effects are represented by dummy variables indicating the month and year in which the mortgage transaction occurred. Regional dummy variables (representing the Northeast, Midwest, and South) capture differences in mortgage rates across regions of the country. The estimating equations embody several different specifications of the connection between *RATE* and *POINTS*. In the first, *POINTS* enters linearly in the equation, implying that the marginal *RATE* discount from an increase in *POINTS* is the same over the entire range of the variables. As seen in the first column of Table 2, the *POINTS* coefficient under this specification is equal to  $-0.0758$ , indicating that a 100 basis-point increase in points yields a 7.6 basis-point reduction in *RATE* (for example, *RATE* might fall from 9.576 percent to 9.500 percent). This effect is statistically significant (coefficients of the regional and time dummies are not reported).<sup>17</sup>

Another approach is to classify mortgages into high-points and low-points ranges, indicated by a dummy variable. Table 2 shows the effect of two different classifications, which define a high-points mortgage to be a contract with *POINTS* greater than or equal to 200 basis points, or alternatively, greater than or equal to 200 basis points.<sup>18</sup> Using the first classification, the high-points dummy variable has a statistically-significant coefficient of  $-12.77$ , indicating that the *RATE* discount on contracts with *POINTS* above 250 is nearly 13 basis points. The dummy coefficient for the second classification is  $-13.18$ , showing a *RATE* discount of slightly more than 13 basis points.

**c. Mobility proxy.** To test the hypothesis that mobile borrowers choose low-points mortgages, a proxy for mobility is needed. Brueckner and Follain (1988), who used the same NAR database to investigate the FRM-ARM choice, measured mobility through a dummy variable *NEWCITY* indicating whether the borrower is new to the metropolitan area (intermetropolitan movers were expected to be more mobile than intrametropolitan movers). Since the effect of the *NEWCITY* variable on mortgage points is not statistically significant, a different proxy is constructed using panel data from the American Housing Survey.<sup>19</sup>

This auxiliary sample consists of a set of 2106 houses that were purchased between 1984 and 1985 using a fixed-rate mortgage and were observed again in 1989. Mobility patterns for the initial occupants of these houses are explained using a probit equation.



The dependent variable is set equal to one if the initial occupant had moved by 1989, and is set equal to zero otherwise. After some experimentation, the following variables, which are common to both the NAR and American Housing Survey databases, were selected to explain observed mobility: regional dummies for the Northeast, Midwest, and South (*NEAST*, *MIDWEST*, and *SOUTH*); a dummy indicating whether the home purchased in 1985 was a detached single-family dwelling (*SINGLFAM*); a dummy indicating whether the household was a first-time homebuyer (*FRSTHOME*); a dummy indicating whether the household's residence prior to 1985 was in the same metropolitan area (*SAMECITY*, equal to 1 – *NEWCITY* above); a dummy indicating whether the household contained a married couple (*MARRIED*); the age of the household head in 1985 (*AGE*); the number of bedrooms in the home (*BEDRMS*); the home's purchase price (*PRICE*); the log of household income (*LINC*); the number of children in the household (*KIDS*); and a dummy variable indicating a central city location in 1985 (*CENTCITY*).

The probit results are presented in Table 3. The results show lower mobility in the Northeast and Midwest than in the West (the default region), and relatively low mobility among older buyers and among buyers of expensive, single-family detached houses. Mobility is also low among intrametropolitan movers, confirming Brueckner and Follain's expectation for this variable (the coefficients of all these variables are statistically significant). While mobility also appears to be lower among married households with children, among first-time buyers and central-city households, and among high-income households, none of these effects is statistically significant (house size as measured by *BEDRMS* also has no effect).

To generate a mobility proxy for use in explaining the *POINTS* choice, the estimated coefficients in Table 3 are used to compute the probability of moving for each household in the NAR sample, denoted *PROBMOVE* (from above, the relevant time horizon is four years). The sample mean value of *PROBMOVE* is 0.290, and the minimum and maximum values are 0.051 and 0.563 respectively.

**d. The effect of mobility on POINTS.** The most direct way to test the hypothesis that high-mobility borrowers choose low-points mortgages is to regress *POINTS* on *PROBMOVE*. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) results for this regression are reported in the first column of Table 4. The estimated coefficient of *PROBMOVE* is negative, as ex-

pected, and statistically significant. Its magnitude of  $-168$  shows that when a borrower's probability of moving rises by 0.10, *POINTS* decreases by 17 basis points. Note that the significant impact of *PROBMOVE* emerges despite the fact that the  $R^2$  for the equation is quite small (under 2%). The third column of Table 4 shows the effect of adding *LINC* and *FRSTHOME* to the regression, variables that may reflect the household's ability to pay extra costs at the time of mortgage origination. While these variables affect *POINTS* in a plausible manner (positively for *LINC* and negatively for *FRSTHOME*), both coefficients are insignificant. Moreover, use of these additional variables has little effect on the magnitude and significance level of the *PROBMOVE* coefficient. Observe, however, that the  $R^2$  for the regression remains low, suggesting that other, unobserved variables may play a role in the choice of *POINTS*.

Given that *PROBMOVE* is the estimated (instead of true) probability of moving, the error term in the above regression does not satisfy the assumptions required for application of OLS. In particular, the error term includes the difference between the estimated and true move probabilities, a quantity that in turn depends on the estimated probit coefficients from Table 3. Because these coefficients enter the error term for each observation, all the errors are correlated, implying that generalized least-squares (GLS) is the appropriate estimation technique. Application of this technique, which is explained in the appendix, leads to the results in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.<sup>20</sup> Although the t-statistics for *PROBMOVE* fall somewhat, the estimates are generally similar to the OLS results.

**e. Testing for adverse selection.** By showing that mobile borrowers choose low-points contracts, the preceding results constitute a test of a key prediction of the model. However, because this prediction also reflects conventional wisdom, the results can be viewed as a test of this wisdom, independent of any particular model. To test a prediction that is more specific to the present framework, the empirical focus shifts to the question of adverse selection.<sup>21</sup>

The test for adverse selection is based on the observation that, when the equilibrium has this property, one borrower type is indifferent between the available mortgage contracts, while the other type strictly prefers one contract. In other words, the market trade-off between  $i_0$  and  $i_1$  is the same as the trade-off along an indifference curve for one borrower

type, while the other borrower's curve exhibits a steeper trade-off (refer, for example, to points  $J$  and  $K$  in Figure 2). As will be seen, the test based on this observation involves a number of strong assumptions. As a result, it is best to view the test as illustrating a methodology rather than establishing a firm conclusion.

The market trade-off between  $i_0$  and  $i_1$  (between points and the interest rate) has already been estimated in the regressions reported in Table 2. The remaining task is to estimate the borrower's utility function so that the above comparison can be carried out. To simplify matters, let the function  $V$  be approximated by a linear expression with parameter  $\Omega$ . Ignoring the  $\Gamma$  and  $\Psi$  terms (which cancel below), the expected utility expression (1) then becomes  $\Omega(y - i_0) + \delta(1 - \rho_m)\Omega(y - i_1)$ ,  $m = h, l$ . To estimate  $\Omega$  and  $\delta$ , the sample is divided arbitrarily into high-points and low-points contracts, as discussed above, and a probit procedure is applied, as follows. Denoting the contracts by  $H$  and  $L$ , and using the notation of Section 2, initial payments are equal to  $i_0^H = t^H + p^H$  and  $i_0^L = t^L + p^L$ , and final payments are equal to  $i_1^H = t^H$  and  $i_1^L = t^L$ , where  $t$  and  $p$  again denote interest rate and points. Expected utility of the  $H$  contract for a type- $m$  borrower is  $\Omega[y - (t^H + p^H) + \delta(1 - \rho_m)(y - t^H)]$ ,  $m = h, l$ , and a similar expression holds for the  $L$  contract. The difference in utilities between the  $H$  and  $L$  contracts is then

$$-\Omega[(t^H + p^H) - (t^L + p^L)] - \Omega\delta(1 - \rho_m)(t^H - t^L), \quad m = h, l. \quad (11)$$

Using (11),  $\Omega$  and  $\delta$  can be estimated by a probit procedure, with the dependent variable equal to one under the  $H$  choice and zero under the  $L$  choice. Replacing  $t$  and  $p$  by the empirical variables  $RATE$  and  $POINTS$ , the explanatory variables (denoted  $X$  and  $Y$ ) are, for observation  $k$ ,

$$X_k = RATE^H + POINTS^H - (RATE^L + POINTS^L) \quad (12)$$

$$Y_k = (1 - PROBMOVE_k)(RATE^H - RATE^L). \quad (13)$$

The coefficients of these variables are  $-\Omega$  and  $-\delta\Omega$  respectively, so that the borrower's discount factor  $\delta$  can be recovered by taking their ratio. Note that the variable  $X$ , which is

constant across observations, plays the role of the intercept variable (normally set equal to one).

The probit procedure is implemented using alternative specifications based on the two high-points cut-offs discussed earlier (recall that these are 200 and 250 basis points). The difference  $RATE^H - RATE^L$  is set equal to the appropriate dummy coefficient from Table 2:  $-12.77$  in the 200 case, and  $-13.18$  in the 250 case.  $POINTS^H - POINTS^L$  is computed as the difference in the mean value of  $POINTS$  between the high-points and low-points subsamples. This difference is 136 basis points under the 200 cut-off and 138 basis points under the 250 cut-off.

Probit estimates are presented in Table 5, with the two columns showing the results for the different high-points cut-offs.<sup>22</sup> In both cases, the coefficients of  $X$  and  $Y$  are negative and statistically significant, as required by the model. The results thus provide additional confirmation of the hypothesized inverse relationship between points and borrower mobility. The implied discount factor (the  $Y$  coefficient divided by the  $X$  coefficient) differs across equations, mainly because of the difference in  $X$  coefficients. The implied estimate of  $\delta$  is 19.8 for the 200 cut-off and 11.8 for the 250 cut-off. While these values greatly exceed unity, in apparent contradiction of the model, the explanation lies in the fact that the model collapses the future into a single period.<sup>23</sup>

To carry out a test for the presence of adverse selection, the two estimates of  $\delta$  are averaged to yield an intermediate value of 15.8. Using this  $\delta$  value, the marginal rate of substitution between  $i_1$  and  $i_0$ , equal to  $1/\delta(1 - \rho)$  from (2), is computed for representative low-mobility and high-mobility borrowers. In particular, the  $MRS$  is evaluated for  $PROBMOVE$  values one standard deviation above and below the sample mean of 0.2904. These  $PROBMOVE$  values are 0.2234 and 0.3574, and the resulting  $MRS$ 's equal 0.081 and 0.098 for the low- and high-mobility borrowers respectively.

These  $MRS$ 's can be compared to the trade-off between  $i_1$  and  $i_0$  available in the market. Recalling from Table 2 that a 100-basis-point increase in  $POINTS$  reduces the interest rate by 7.58 basis points, it follows that a 7.58 decrease in  $t$  is associated with a  $92.42 = 100 - 7.58$  increase in  $t + p$ . This implies that the trade-off between  $i_1$  and  $i_0$  occurs at a rate of  $0.082 = 7.58/92.24$ .

Comparing this value to the *MRS* figures from above, it is clear that the low-mobility borrower is almost exactly indifferent among choices from the available points/interest rate menu ( $0.081 \approx 0.082$ ). The *MRS* of the high-mobility borrower, however, is greater than the slope of this menu ( $0.098 > 0.082$ ). The equilibrium outcome thus appears to resemble that in the lower half of Figure 2, where the type-*l* borrower is indifferent between contracts *J* and *K*, while the type-*h* indifference curve is steeper than the line segment connecting *J* and *K*. The results appear to suggest, therefore, that adverse selection is present in the market, and that high-mobility borrowers are harmed by it. However, since this conclusion rests on a number of assumptions, it is best viewed as illustrative.<sup>24</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

This paper has analyzed a simple mobility-based model of mortgage lending with asymmetric information, and has used the results to illuminate the issue of mortgage points. The analysis suggests that by offering a points/interest-rate menu, lenders are able to induce borrower self-selection across mortgage contracts according to unobserved mobility. The self-selection implied by the model conforms to conventional wisdom, with mobile borrowers choosing low-points/high-rate contracts from the available menu. As in other adverse-selection models, separation of the borrower types is achieved at a cost: welfare is reduced relative to the full-information case. The analysis shows that this cost can be borne by either borrower type (high-mobility or low-mobility) depending on parameter values. Finally, the analysis shows that a prepayment penalty is not a perfect substitute for mortgage points in the presence of adverse selection. Introduction of such a penalty either lowers or raises welfare, depending on the characteristics of the mortgage market equilibrium.

The empirical results show that a points/interest-rate trade-off is present in the data, and that borrowers select contracts from this menu in the expected fashion according to mobility. In addition, the results suggest evidence of adverse selection, although this conclusion is not definitive.

This paper may help improve our understanding of the role of borrower mobility and asymmetric information in the mortgage market. Further research exploring the effects of both these factors on the structure of mortgage contracts deserves high priority.

## Appendix

**a. Analysis of the prepayment penalty.** First, it is shown that introduction of the prepayment penalty has no effect on the welfare of the type- $l$  borrower. Using the modified version of (1), the change expected utility is equal to

$$-(1 - \rho_l) \left[ V'(y - i_0^K) \frac{\partial i_0^K}{\partial s} + \delta V'(y - i_1^K) \frac{\partial i_1^K}{\partial s} \right] - \rho_m V'(y - i_0^K - s) \left[ 1 + \frac{\partial i_0^K}{\partial s} \right]. \quad (a1)$$

Substituting from (8) and evaluating at  $s = 0$ , (a1) reduces to zero.

To derive the impact of the prepayment penalty on the type- $h$  contract, the following equations are differentiated:

$$(1 - \rho_l)[V(y - i_0^J) + \delta V(y - i_1^J)] + \rho_l V(y - i_0^J - s) = \text{constant} \quad (a2)$$

$$i_1^J = r_1 + \frac{r_0 - i_0^J - \rho_h s}{\theta(1 - \rho_h)}. \quad (a3)$$

Eq. (a3) is the zero-profit condition (the type- $h$  locus is now relevant), and (a2) is the adverse-selection condition discussed in the text. Differentiation of (a2) and (a3) yields the following impacts:

$$\frac{\partial i_1^J}{\partial s} = Z [(\rho_l - \rho_h)V'(y - i_0^J)] > 0, \quad (a4)$$

$$\frac{\partial i_0^J}{\partial s} = Z [\delta \rho_h (1 - \rho_l)V'(y - i_1^J) - \theta(1 - \rho_h)\rho_l V'(y - i_0^J)] > (<) 0, \quad (a5)$$

where

$$Z = [\theta(1 - \rho_h)V'(y - i_0^J) - \delta(1 - \rho_l)V'(y - i_1^J)]^{-1} < 0. \quad (a6)$$

To verify that  $Z$  has a negative sign, observe that since the type- $h$  indifference curve is flatter than the zero profit locus at  $J$ ,  $V'(y - i_0^J)/\delta(1 - \rho_h)V'(y - i_1^J) < 1/\theta(1 - \rho_h)$  holds (see (2)), implying  $\theta V'(y - i_0^J) < \delta V'(y - i_1^J)$ . Given  $(1 - \rho_h) < (1 - \rho_l)$ ,  $Z$  is then negative, and the positive sign of  $\partial i_1^J/\partial s$  in (a4) follows by inspection. Manipulation of (a4) and (a5) establishes  $\partial(i_0^J - i_1^J)/\partial s < 0$ .

To compute the welfare impact on the type- $h$  borrower, an expression analogous to (a1) is evaluated ( $\rho_l$  is replaced by  $\rho_h$ , and the  $K$  subscripts are replaced by  $J$ ). Substituting the results from (a4) and (a5), the welfare impact simplifies to

$$-Z(1 - \rho_h)(\rho_h - \rho_l)V'(y - i_0^J)[\theta V'(y - i_0^J) - \delta V'(y - i_1^J)] < 0, \quad (a7)$$

where the inequality follows from previous results. Thus, introduction of the prepayment penalty *reduces* expected utility for the type- $h$  borrower.

Now suppose the tangencies are above  $Q$  and the type- $l$  borrower is the one hurt by adverse selection. In this case, the contracts are relabeled  $A$  and  $F$ , as in Figure 2, and the  $h$  and  $l$  subscripts change places in the analysis. In addition, since the indifference curve at  $F$  is steeper than the zero-profit locus, the sign of  $Z$  changes to positive, and the term analogous to the one in brackets in (a7) also becomes positive. The welfare effect based on the analog to (a7) is then *positive* instead of negative.

**b. The GLS procedure.** The GLS procedure is carried out as follows. Let the true model determining *POINTS* be  $POINTS_i = \eta'W_i + \beta P_i + u_i$ , where  $P_i$  equals *PROBMOVE* for observation  $i$ ,  $W_i$  is a vector of other explanatory variables,  $u_i$  is an error term with mean zero and variance  $\sigma_u^2$ , and  $\eta$  and  $\beta$  are coefficients ( $\eta$  is a vector). Replacing  $P_i$  with its estimated value  $\hat{P}_i$ , the model can be rewritten

$$POINTS_i = \eta'W_i + \beta \hat{P}_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (a8)$$

where  $\epsilon_i = u_i + \beta(P_i - \hat{P}_i)$ . Let  $\hat{\gamma}$  denote the vector of estimated probit coefficients from the mobility equation and  $Z_i$  denote the vector of explanatory variables in that equation for observation  $i$  (the values of these variables are drawn from the NAR data set, not from the AHS data set used to generate  $\hat{\gamma}$ ). Then, letting  $\Phi$  denote the standard normal cumulative distribution function,  $P_i - \hat{P}_i = \Phi(\gamma'Z_i) - \Phi(\hat{\gamma}'Z_i)$ . Using a Taylor series expansion, the right-hand side of this equality can be approximated by  $\phi(\gamma'Z_i)(\gamma'Z_i - \hat{\gamma}'Z_i)$ , where  $\phi$  is the normal density function. Let the matrix  $A$  be defined as

$$A = [\phi(\gamma'Z_1)Z_1 \cdots \phi(\gamma'Z_n)Z_n]. \quad (a9)$$

Then the variance-covariance matrix of the error vector  $\epsilon$  is equal to

$$\Lambda \equiv \sigma_u^2 I + \beta^2 A' \Delta A, \quad (a10)$$

where  $\Delta$  is the variance-covariance matrix of  $\hat{\gamma}$ .

$\Lambda$  must be estimated to carry out the GLS procedure. Estimates of the unknown parameters in  $\beta^2 A' \Delta A$  are available from the probit and OLS results. An estimate of  $\sigma_u^2$  is derived by first noting that, given the formula for  $\epsilon_i$ , the probability limit of  $\sum \epsilon_i^2/n$  is equal to  $\sigma_u^2$  plus the probability limit of  $\beta^2 \sum \phi(\gamma' Z_i)^2 (\hat{\gamma}' Z_i - \gamma' Z_i)^2/n$  ( $n$  is the sample size). The latter probability limit is equal to the limit of  $\beta^2 \sum \phi(\gamma' Z_i)^2 Z_i' \Delta Z_i/n$  as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ . The plim of  $\sum \epsilon_i^2/n$  can be estimated by  $\sum e_i^2/n \equiv \hat{\sigma}_\epsilon^2$ , where the  $e_i$  are residuals from the OLS regression. Therefore,  $\sigma_u^2$  can be estimated by

$$\hat{\sigma}_u^2 \equiv \hat{\sigma}_\epsilon^2 - \hat{\beta}^2 \sum \phi(\hat{\gamma}' Z_i)^2 Z_i' \hat{\Delta} Z_i/n. \quad (a11)$$






Figure 1.




Figure 2.




Figure 3.

**Table 1.**

The Sample Distribution of Mortgage Points\*

<u>POINTS</u>	<u>Observations</u>
5	1
25	4
38	1
50	1
75	2
88	1
100	58
125	4
138	2
150	30
163	1
175	8
185	1
187	1
200	131
220	1
225	9
238	1
250	29
265	1
275	4
288	3
300	106
325	2
338	1
350	5
375	2
400	5
450	2
750	1
total	418

\**POINTS* is measured in basis points

**Table 2.**

*POINTS* Coefficients in *RATE* Regressions\*

<u><i>POINTS</i> enters equation as:</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Linear variable	-0.0758 (3.17)
Dummy equal to one when <i>POINTS</i> $\geq$ 200	-12.77 (2.92)
Dummy equal to one when <i>POINTS</i> $\geq$ 250	-13.18 (3.24)

\*t-statistics in parenthesis;  
observations=812

**Table 3.**

Probit Estimates of the Mobility Equation\*

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
<i>CONSTANT</i>	0.8219 (2.45)
<i>NEAST</i>	-0.3001 (3.25)
<i>MIDWEST</i>	-0.2486 (2.91)
<i>SOUTH</i>	-0.0701 (0.89)
<i>SINGLFAM</i>	-0.1650 (2.31)
<i>FRSTHOME</i>	-0.0709 (1.08)
<i>SAMECITY</i>	-0.1645 (2.77)
<i>MARRIED</i>	-0.0183 (0.27)
<i>AGE</i>	-0.0059 (2.05)
<i>BEDRMS</i>	-0.0530 (1.31)
<i>PRICE</i>	-0.0015 (2.23)
<i>LINC</i>	-0.0227 (0.78)
<i>KIDS</i>	-0.0092 (0.34)
<i>CENTCITY</i>	-0.0506 (0.79)

\*Dependent variable is one if a move occurred and zero otherwise;  
asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses;  
observations=2106

**Table 4.**Regressions Relating *POINTS* to *PROBMOVE*\*

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficients</u>			
	<u>OLS</u>	<u>GLS</u>	<u>OLS</u>	<u>GLS</u>
<i>CONSTANT</i>	265.31 (14.80)	265.84 (13.11)	234.31 (1.66)	201.60 (1.38)
<i>PROBMOVE</i>	-167.73 (2.78)	-165.87 (2.57)	-151.67 (2.10)	-142.29 (1.90)
<i>LINC</i>	—	—	2.67 (0.23)	5.53 (0.45)
<i>FRSTHOME</i>	—	—	-15.51 (1.41)	-14.18 (1.25)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.018	0.018	0.024	0.024

\*t-statistics (or asymptotic t-statistics) in parentheses;  
observations=418

**Table 5.**

Probit Estimates of the Borrower Utility Function\*

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficients</u>	
	<u>200 cut-off</u>	<u>250 cut-off</u>
<i>X</i>	−0.012 (2.15)	−0.020 (3.64)
<i>Y</i>	−0.234 (3.00)	−0.237 (3.24)

\*asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses  
observations=418



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## Footnotes

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<sup>1</sup>See also Brueckner and Follain (1989) and Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1990). Brueckner (1992) shows that with a continuum of borrower types differentiated by mobility, the division of borrowers between ARMs and fixed-rate loans is endogenous and dependent on market conditions. For a related analysis, see Rosenthal and Zorn (1992).

<sup>2</sup>Kau and Keenan (1987) develop an alternative model where points emerge as a result of asymmetric tax treatment of lenders and borrowers.

<sup>3</sup>As explained below, lenders in the model are risk neutral while borrowers are risk averse. Under these circumstances, efficient mortgage contracts require that all interest-rate risk be borne by the lender (see Arvan and Brueckner (1986)). Adjustable-rate mortgages are therefore inefficient, and they will not emerge in a mortgage market equilibrium. This allows the analysis to focus on fixed-payment mortgages.

<sup>4</sup>Note that saving and non-mortgage borrowing is suppressed in the model. If additional borrowing to help defray mortgage costs were allowed, then high mortgage payments would reduce future disposable income because of the need to repay these supplementary loans. In this case,  $\Gamma_m$  and  $\Psi_m$  would depend on  $i_0$  and  $i_1$ .

<sup>5</sup>Implicitly, housing appreciation is also absent.

<sup>6</sup>Empirical evidence on refinancing is provided by Green and Shoven (1986), Quigley (1987), and Quigley and Van Order (1990). Analysis of financially-motivated prepayment also underlies option-based models of mortgage pricing, which are developed by Hall (1985), Kau, Keenan, Muller and Epperson (1992), and Follain, Scott and Yang (1992) (see the survey article by Hendershott and Van Order (1987) for further references).

<sup>7</sup>This profit expression depends critically on the fact that lending is supported by financial intermediation (i.e., by funds from depositors). Suppose instead that a loan of one dollar were made from the lender's own funds, with the principal repaid along with  $i_1$ . Then, in the case where  $\rho_m = 0$ , the present value of profit from the loan would equal  $-1 + \theta i_0 + \theta^2(i_1 + 1)$  instead of  $i_0 - r_0 + \theta(i_1 - r_1)$ , and a similar expression would apply when

$\rho_m > 0$ .

<sup>8</sup>To see the effect of a longer mortgage term, suppose that the term is  $T + 1 > 2$  periods. In this case, (3) is replaced by

$$i_0 - r_0 + \sum_{j=1}^T [\theta(1 - \rho_m)]^j (i_j - r_j), \quad m = h, l,$$

where  $i_j$  and  $r_j$  are the mortgage payment per dollar of loan and the expected cost of funds in period  $j$ . Assuming that  $i_j = i_1$  and  $r_j = r_1$ ,  $j = 2, \dots, T$ , so that payments and the cost of funds are constant beyond period zero, the zero-profit locus based on (3) can be written

$$i_1 = r_1 + \frac{r_0 - i_0}{\theta(1 - \rho_m)} B_m, \quad m = h, l,$$

where

$$B_m = \frac{1 - \theta(1 - \rho_m)}{1 - [\theta(1 - \rho_m)]^T}, \quad m = h, l.$$

Similarly, the term  $(1 - \rho_m)\delta V(y - i_1)$  in (1) is replaced by  $\delta(1 - \rho_m)A_m V(y - i_1)$ , where

$$A_m = \frac{1 - [\delta(1 - \rho_m)]^T}{1 - \delta(1 - \rho_m)}, \quad m = h, l.$$

Results of the analysis are unaffected.

<sup>9</sup>This fact can be established as follows. Since

$$\frac{V'(y - i_0^A)}{\delta(1 - \rho_h)V'(y - i_1^A)} = \frac{1}{\delta(1 - \rho_h)}$$

holds at point  $A$  in Figure 1, it follows that

$$\frac{V'(y - i_0^A)}{\delta(1 - \rho_l)V'(y - i_1^N)} > \frac{1}{\delta(1 - \rho_l)}$$

holds at point  $N$  (not shown), which lies on the type- $l$  locus directly below  $A$  (its coordinates are  $(i_0^A, i_1^N)$ ). Therefore, the type- $l$  indifference curve is steeper than the type- $l$  locus at  $N$ , implying that the tangency is located uphill from  $N$ . Similarly,

$$\frac{V'(y - i_0^P)}{\delta(1 - \rho_l)V'(y - i_1^A)} < \frac{1}{\delta(1 - \rho_l)}$$

holds at point  $P$  (not shown), which lies on the type- $l$  locus directly to the left of  $A$  (its coordinates are  $(i_0^P, i_1^A)$ ). The type- $l$  indifference curve is thus flatter than the locus at point  $P$ , implying that the tangency lies downhill from  $P$  (note that point  $P$  may have

a negative  $i_0$  coordinate, a possibility that has no effect on the argument). While this argument ignores potential corner solutions, the result in the text applies as long as at least one of the indifference curves is tangent to its respective locus. Finally, analogous reasoning applies to the case where the tangencies are below the intersection point.

<sup>10</sup>To establish this claim, the first step is to observe that individual contracts must break even, ruling out cross subsidies. To see this, suppose that in equilibrium, each lender were to offer contracts  $C$  and  $D$  in Figure 1, assigned to type- $l$  and type- $h$  borrowers respectively.  $C$  lies below the type- $l$  locus, and is thus unprofitable, but the loss is made up by the profit earned on contract  $D$ , which lies above the type- $h$  locus. In this situation, if the alternative contract  $E$ , earmarked for type- $h$  borrowers, were offered by some lender, it would be profitable and would attract  $h$ -types away from contract  $D$ , in violation of requirement (ii) above. Note that the same conclusion would apply in the “pooling” case where contracts  $C$  and  $D$  are identical. The upshot is that contracts must break even on an individual basis, lying on the two zero-profit loci. Moreover, unless each contract coincides with the tangency point on its respective locus, there will exist preferred contracts that are profitable, in violation of (ii).

<sup>11</sup>Note that the type- $h$  indifference curve through point  $A$  could intersect the type- $l$  locus twice, once at a point like  $F$  and again at an uphill point  $R$ . It is easy to see, however, that point  $R$  and all uphill points are dispreferred to  $F$  by the type- $l$  borrower (observe that the type- $l$  indifference curve through  $R$  must be flatter than the type- $h$  curve, which implies that it lies above the latter curve to the right of  $R$  and thus passes above  $F$ ).

<sup>12</sup>This statement requires an additional qualification. If type- $l$  borrowers make up a very high proportion of the population, then a contract such as  $S$  in Figure 2 would earn a profit if both borrower types chose it. Since both types do indeed prefer  $S$  over their respective contracts,  $F$  and  $A$ , a lender could offer  $S$ , attract both borrower types, and earn a profit, indicating that  $F$  and  $A$  are not equilibrium contracts. Since contract  $S$  is itself not an equilibrium for reasons discussed above, the conclusion is that equilibrium does not exist. To rule out this possibility, the type- $l$  proportion of the population must be low enough so that all break-even pooling contracts lie above the type- $l$  indifference curve through  $F$ . A similar qualification applies to the alternate case discussed next.

<sup>13</sup>I am grateful to Jack Marshall for these observations.

<sup>14</sup>In the alternate case where  $Q$  lies above the 45 degree line, a diagram analogous to Figure 3 shows that in equilibrium, the low-mobility borrower selects his full-information contract (the corner solution on the 45 degree line), while the high-mobility borrower selects the contract located at the intersection of his zero-profit locus and the low-mobility borrower’s indifference curve. The resulting equilibrium has the low-mobility borrower choosing a zero-points mortgage, and the high-mobility borrower choosing a positive-points contract.

<sup>15</sup>Dunn and Spatt (1985) offer a related analysis of prepayment penalties.

<sup>16</sup>A larger sample, which includes observations with missing values for some borrower-characteristics variables, is used for the rate regressions. This sample has 812 observations.

<sup>17</sup>The possibility that the *RATE* discount varies with time and region, which would call for interactions between *POINTS* and the dummies, is ruled out (results under such a specification are unsatisfactory).

<sup>18</sup>In the 812-observation sample used for the rate regressions, 72% of the observations are high-points contracts under the 200 cut-off, while 38% are high-points contracts under the 250 cut-off.

<sup>19</sup>I am indebted to Stuart Rosenthal for suggesting this approach and for giving me access to his AHS data.

<sup>20</sup>I am indebted to Glenn Sueyoshi for help in deriving the GLS procedure.

<sup>21</sup>For an attempt to test for adverse selection in insurance markets, see Puelz and Snow (1992).

<sup>22</sup>While both explanatory variables in the probit equation are estimated variables, no attempt is made to correct the standard errors of the coefficients.

<sup>23</sup>From footnote 6, the discount factor applied to utility from future periods is

$$A_m = \delta(1 - \rho_m) \frac{1 - [\delta(1 - \rho_m)]^T}{1 - \delta(1 - \rho_m)}, \quad m = h, l,$$

which does not simplify into a simple function of  $\delta$  and  $\rho_m$ . The empirical model is derived by approximating this expression by  $\tilde{\delta}(1 - \rho_m)$ , where  $\tilde{\delta}$  can be thought of as the discount factor for the entire future, which can be greater than unity.

<sup>24</sup>The probit results could be used directly to test for the presence of adverse selection, as follows. First, using the estimates, utility levels for the low-points and high-points contracts would be compared for the average low-points borrower (this is done by evaluating (11) with  $\rho_m$  set equal to the average value of *PROBMOVE* for low-points borrowers). Similarly, the utility levels of the two contracts would be compared for the average high-points borrower. If the results of these calculations showed that one borrower is roughly indifferent between the contracts while the other borrower strictly prefers his own contract, that would constitute evidence of adverse selection (this procedure is equivalent to

comparing each borrower's  $MRS$  to the  $i_1/i_0$  trade-off between the  $H$  and  $L$  contracts, as in the text).

Unfortunately, the results of these calculations are not informative. While the average high-points borrower prefers his own contract in the case of the 200 cut-off, this contract *is also preferred by the average low-points borrower*. For the 250 cut-off, exactly the reverse is true: the low-points borrower prefers his own contract, but it is also preferred by the high-points borrower. It is important to realize that nothing in the probit estimation procedure prevents this type of anomaly in utility comparisons. While the calculations in the text rely on the probit estimates of  $\delta$ , the procedure differs by using the  $i_1/i_0$  trade-off from the linear regression, and by using *PROBMOVE* values separated by two standard deviations to evaluate  $\rho_h$  and  $\rho_l$  (the average *PROBMOVE* values in the high-points and low-points subsamples are much closer, differing by less than 0.025).







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